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1. Introduction 
The standard practice in most developed countries is to identify the poor on the basis of a poverty line 
defined as a specific fraction of the median cash income within a country.1 Underlying the application 
of such a country-specific poverty line is the assumption that everybody faces the same cost of living. 
This is clearly in conflict with conventional wisdom. For instance, housing costs in most developed 
countries differ significantly between rural and urban areas. Since housing prices normally tend to be 
lower in rural than in urban areas, the purchasing power of incomes in rural areas might be 
undervalued. Thus, to estimate measures of poverty or inequality in a country it is required to account 
for price differences across regions. Two alternative methods for dealing with this problem are 
discussed below. The direct and obvious method is to use a purchasing power index, whereas the 
indirect method treats municipalities as separate units and assess poverty on the basis of municipality-
specific poverty lines.  
 
Another basic shortcoming of the standard approach to poverty measurement is the omission of public 
in-kind benefits in the income definition; not least since about half of welfare state transfers in 
developed countries are in-kind benefits like health insurance, education and other services (Garfinkel 
et al., 2006). Consequently, poverty estimates relying on a country-specific poverty line based on a 
cash income measure might be biased. This bias is likely to carry over to comparative poverty studies, 
even if adjustments are made for differences in per capita expenditure on public services and average 
price levels across countries, but not for the variation in regional prices and the value of public 
services within countries.  
 
Objective. The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of local government spending and 
geographical cost of living differences on the level and time trend of poverty as well as on the 
geographic and demographic poverty profiles. Will extending the income measure with the value of 
local public services change the picture of poverty? And to what extent will poverty estimates be 
affected by accounting for cost of living differences across regions?  
 
Local public services. To account for the impact of local public services on poverty estimates, we 
draw on the approach proposed by Aaberge and Langørgen (2006) for valuing and allocating public 
services on individual and household basis. The valuation method for public services is derived from a 
                                                     
1 A large body of empirical research on poverty employs such poverty lines. This approach is followed in the study of 
poverty on national level and by region in the Nordic countries (Gustafsson and Pedersen, 2000). Furthermore, it is used to 
describe the poverty pattern in the OECD countries (Atkinson et al., 1995; Forster and Pearson, 2002) and in the European 
Union (O'Higgins and Jenkins, 1990). 
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structural model of spending behavior of local governments, where spending on different services is 
specified as a function of economic, social, demographic and geographic variables. Unlike the 
standard approach in studies of the distribution of public services, the method we use to value sector-
specific local public services allows for differences between municipalities in the costs and capacity to 
produce public services. Furthermore, recipient frequencies in various demographic groups are used as 
the basis for determining the allocation of the value of these services on citizens of the municipalities. 
On this basis, an extended income measure, defined as the sum of cash income and the value of 
municipal in-kind benefits received by the household and the individual, is constructed. 
 
Geographical cost of living differences. Extending the traditional cash income measure with in-kind 
benefits from local government spending is only half the job; disregarding geographical differences in 
the cost of living within a country may, nevertheless, lead to a misleading picture of poverty. In 
particular, accounting for the large variation in housing costs between rural and urban areas is 
necessary to ensure that a given amount of income entails the same consumption potential across 
regions. In an attempt to transform the observed incomes into real incomes, we estimate a set of 
municipal housing price indices. On the basis of the distribution of real incomes within the country, a 
country-specific real income poverty line may be drawn and the poor identified.  
 
This procedure takes account of geographical differences in housing costs, but not differences in other 
costs, and even for housing costs it assigns index values that may be in error for reasons ranging from 
substitution bias in the price indices to differences across areas in housing quality. Unfortunately, 
Norway as most other countries lack credible data at a sufficiently disaggregated geographical level on 
housing unit characteristics and local amenities as well as on the prices of non-housing goods. The 
binding constraint for transforming the observed incomes into real incomes in an empirically sound 
manner may therefore very well be the data. A possible response to these problems, which is proposed 
by Mogstad et al. (2007), is to specify disaggregated poverty lines. The purpose of applying such 
disaggregated poverty lines is to provide a meaningful measure of poverty in a country with 
geographical cost of living differences, when local price indices are too crude to produce sufficient 
comparability of income across areas. We follow this approach and specify a set of municipal-specific 
poverty lines according to the median income within each municipality. The poor are then defined as 
those whose income fall considerably short of the income commanded by the “representative” 
individual in their municipality.  
 
Data. This paper exploits a number of exceptionally rich Norwegian data sets. First of all, we use a 
household panel data set based on administrative registers covering the entire resident population of 
Norway in the years 1993-2001; a period that includes both a soaring boom and a small recession. 
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These household and demographic data are supplemented with detailed income data from the Tax 
Assessment Files. In addition, we rely on comprehensive sector-specific information on local 
government spending, detailed information about municipal characteristics, recipient statistics 
reported by local governments, and sample surveys on the use of local public services. Furthermore, 
we utilise annual data on prices (per square meter) of same type of houses sold in the various 
municipalities as a proxy for the relative cost of housing across areas. Access to these unique data 
sources is critical for dealing with interpersonal differences within a country that arise due to local 
public services and variation in the geographical cost of living. In principle, the level of geographical 
aggregation to make adjustments for these factors should be the local labor markets, which are 
approximated well by the more than four hundred municipalities of Norway. By contrast, when data 
are collected from sample surveys the scope for coping with such comparability problems is severely 
limited.2  
 
The Norwegian case. Norway emerges as an interesting country for studying the impact of local public 
services and geographical cost of living differences on poverty estimates for other reasons beside data 
quality. First of all, Norway is a relatively large country with a dispersed population, which has lead to 
a diverging price pattern on basic goods such as housing across the more than four hundred 
municipalities. As most of what we know about the impact of adjusting for geographical cost of living 
differences on poverty estimates comes from the United States, evidence from the institutional context 
of the generous Norwegian welfare state and a centralised wage setting should be of interest.3 
Furthermore, Norway has a relatively large public sector where local governments play an important 
role in the provision of public services. In Norway, the central government has introduced an 
equalization program in the grant system for local governments. However, substantial income 
components like incomes from power plants and regional development transfers are not accounted for 
in the equalization scheme. Moreover, there is variation in local government spending across service 
sectors as well as in spending priorities on different recipient groups (Aaberge and Langørgen, 2003). 
Consequently, some municipalities may be more effective than others in fighting poverty, either 
because they can provide a generally higher level of services or because they are targeting vulnerable 
groups. 
 
                                                     
2 For instance, the much used Luxembourg Income Study database contains too few observations to deal with population 
heterogeneity within a country. Indeed, Aaberge (2001) demonstrates that when sampling errors are taken into account, the 
complete ranking of countries by inequality suggested by the OECD study by Atkinson et al. (1995) have to be replaced by 
ranking of countries in a few groups.  
3 See for instance Short (2001) and Jolliffe (2006) for studies of the impact of geographical cost of living adjustments on 
poverty estimates in the United States.  
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Outline. Section 2 outlines the approach used to value sector-specific local public services and to 
allocate services on individual and household basis. Section 3 discusses how we account for 
geographical differences in the cost of living. Section 4 describes the data and discusses definitional 
issues. Furthermore, this section contrasts the conventional cash income measure with the extended 
income measure and the real income measure. Section 5 examines the impact of local public services 
and geographical cost of living differences on poverty estimates. Section 6 concerns policy 
implications. 
2. Local public services 
Most studies of poverty focus exclusively on cash income and omit the value of public services. 
Smeeding et al. (1993) suggest that this practice may be due to the fact that “the problems inherent in 
the measurement, valuation, and imputation of non-cash income to individual households on the basis 
of micro data files are formidable.” The few studies that make any attempt to account for public in-
kind benefits typically assume that the value of public services is equal to the expenditures in service 
production in a given area. This assumption is questionable, as local governments are known to differ 
both with respect to the costs and the capacity to produce public services. Moreover, the value of the 
public services are usually allocated on the basis of a few demographic characteristics of the 
(potential) recipients, such as gender and age, disregarding variation across areas and socioeconomic 
subgroups of the population.4 
2.1. Valuing sector-specific local public services 
As an alternative to setting the value of public services provided by local governments equal to their 
expenditures in service production, Aaberge and Langørgen (2006) propose a method for valuation 
that accounts for differences across areas in the costs to produce the same standard of local public 
services. The valuation method is derived from the cost structure of a behavioral model of local 
governments developed by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003), where spending on different services is 
specified as a function of economic, social, demographic and geographic variables. This model treats 
local governments as agents that maximize a Stone-Geary utility function subject to a budget 
constraint, which implies that the demand for local public services is described by a linear expenditure 
system. Out-of-sample predictions suggest that the model simulates local government allocations 
rather well. In the model one may distinguish between variables that affect subsistence expenditures 
(minimum required costs) from variables that affect the spending preferences of local governments. 
Moreover, Aaberge and Langørgen (2006) assume that the subsistence expenditure term can be 
                                                     
4 See e.g. Ruggles and O’Higgins (1981), Gemmell (1985), Smeeding et al. (1993), Ruggeri et al. (1994), Garfinkel et al. 
(2006) for studies of the redistributional impact of public services.  
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expressed as a linear separable function of unit costs and subsistence output factors. This paper uses a 
different specification that accounts for the multiplicative relationship between unit costs, subsistence 
output and subsistence expenditure. 
 
Model. As was demonstrated by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003), the linear expenditure system (LES) 
proves helpful in explaining differences in the spending behaviour of Norwegian municipalities, 
provided that account is taken for heterogeneity in sector-specific subsistence expenditures and in the 
preferences for allocation of income on different services.5 In line with the LES-approach we assume 
that municipal data on expenditure are generated from a model specified as a linear expenditure 
system with eight service sectors 
(2.1) 
8 8
1 1
, 1,2,...,8, 1i i i i j j i
j i
u y iγ π β γ π β
= =
⎛ ⎞= + − = =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ , 
where iu  is per capita expenditure
6 on sector i, y is per capita exogenous income of the local 
government, subsistence expenditure i iγ π  in sector i is defined to be the product of its subsistence  
output (or minimum required quantity) iγ  and unit cost iπ , and iβ  is the marginal budget share of 
sector i. 7 Discretionary income is defined by exogenous incomes subtracted total subsistence 
expenditures 
8
1
j j
j
y γ π
=
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ , which yields a measure of how much income the local government may 
dispose of after the subsistence expenditures have been covered. 
 
Heterogeneity in the parameters of the model. By allowing the subsistence output parameters γ, the 
unit cost parameters π and the marginal budget share parameters β to vary with observed variables, we 
obtain a more flexible modeling framework than what is provided by (2.1). However, in order to 
identify variation in unit costs, it is required to assume that certain variables affect unit costs but not 
subsistence output. This assumption helps to clarify the distinction between unit costs and service 
                                                     
5 The local government sectors consist of administration, education, child care, health care, care for the elderly and disabled, 
social services, culture, and infrastructure. 
6 Expenditure ui includes wages to local government employees, purchases of goods and services for public production, and 
social assistance (cash transfers), but excludes interest payments. 
7 The model in Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) treats user fees and budget surplus as well as expenditures on eight service 
sectors as endogenous variables. Since user fees account for a small share of local public incomes, the model has been 
simplified by treating user fees as exogenous in the present paper. Moreover, the model for budget surplus is suppressed in 
the model description, although the estimated model includes budget surplus as one of the model sectors. In Norway, local 
government income consists largely of grants-in-aid from the central government and local income taxes. The central 
government determines the tax rate and the tax base of the income tax, and equalization transfers are designed to be mainly 
unaffected by local government choices. Thus, per capita income of the local government is treated as exogenous in this 
model. 
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needs, and is also instrumental to identify the model.8 Specifically, we introduce the following 
specifications, 
(2.2) 0
1
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ir
i i ik ik
k
z iγ γ γ
=
= + =∑  
and 
(2.3) ( )0
1
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i i ik ik ik
k
p p iπ π π
=
⎡ ⎤= + − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  
where ( )1 2, ,..., ii i irz z z  and ( )1 2, ,..., ii i inp p p  are vectors of variables that affect subsistence output and 
unit prices in service sector i. For instance, we assume that settlement pattern and economies of scale 
affect unit costs, which means that small municipalities with a dispersed population are expected to 
face relatively high unit costs in service production. By contrast, the age structure of the population is 
assumed to affect the need for different services like child care, education and care for the elderly, and 
is consequently assumed to yield heterogeneity in subsistence output parameters. Although these 
assumptions may appear restrictive, they are less restrictive than the standard approach, which ignores 
a possible variation in unit costs and presupposes that the introduced explanatory variables exclusively 
affect output. 
 
Heterogeneity in marginal budget shares might be due to different preferences across municipalities 
for allocating discretionary income on service sectors. Thus the following parameter heterogeneity is 
introduced 
(2.4) 
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where tk is a taste variable that affects the preferences for allocating discretionary income. For 
instance, the party composition of the local government council may influence such service priorities. 
 
                                                     
8 Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) used a different approach by replacing the subsistence expenditure terms with linear 
functions of observed municipality characteristics. 
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Measurement scale and estimation. Equation (2.3) is specified with variables measured as deviations 
from national average levels, where ikp  is the mean of variable k that affects unit costs in service 
sector i. Consequently, the parameter 0iπ  can be interpreted as the average price level in service sector 
i. However, it turns out that these price levels are not identified in the model. Subsistence outputs and 
unit costs are only identified up to a multiplicative constant, since multiplying unit costs by a constant 
and dividing subsistence output by the same constant cannot be traced from the reduced form 
parameters of the model. There exists no obvious scale of measurement for output and unit costs of 
local public services. Yet the two choices of scale are closely related since expenditures are defined by 
the product of output and unit costs. An attractive method is to normalize the average price levels to 1 
( )0 1, 1,2,...,8i iπ = = ,which means that unit cost iπ  is defined as a price index with the average for the 
whole country equal to 1. Moreover, it follows that service outputs are measured in money terms and 
are interpreted as monetary values of output for an average price level. The normalization of prices 
imposes no restrictions on the model other than a choice of measurement scale for prices and outputs. 
Furthermore, these restrictions allow us to identify the model and to derive measures of prices and 
outputs. Thus the model defined by equations (2.1) – (2.4) forms the basis for estimating the 
parameters defined by (2.2) – (2.4). The estimation results are presented in Appendix A. As 
demonstrated by Tables A1 – A3 in Appendix A most parameter estimates are statistically significant 
and of expected signs. 
 
Valuation of public services. When assessing outputs as the value of sector-specific services, we 
divide observed expenditures by the price index reflecting the relative difference in unit costs for 
providing a service across municipalities 
(2.5) * , 1,...,8ii
i
uu iπ= = , 
where *iu  is output measured as the value of services in sector i. Note that the estimated value of 
services for a given municipality may exceed or fall below the municipality’s expenditure, depending 
on the unit costs of the municipality. A high iπ  implies that the municipality has a relatively high cost 
in providing a given level of service in sector i compared to other municipalities. In municipalities 
where iπ  is higher (lower) than 1, the value of services is found to be below (above) the observed 
expenditures. 
 
Equation (2.5) can be seen as an analogue to household equivalence scales. However, note that the 
scale proposed here depends on the income of the municipality, which is not common practice when 
employing household equivalence scales. In addition to adjusting for variation in unit costs, 
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expenditures are also adjusted for regional variation in employers' social security tax rate. The value of 
municipal in-kind benefits is calculated net of user fees.  
2.2. Allocating the value of sector-specific local public services 
To allocate the value of public services on individual and household basis, we need to (i) select 
recipients of different services and (ii) distribute the value of services among the selected recipients. 
To this end, we follow the approach proposed by Aaberge and Langørgen (2006). Below, we give a 
brief overview of the allocation methods and refer to Appendix B for a more detailed description. 
 
The selection of recipients of the various service sectors is based on three different methods; direct 
identification, simulation, and an insurance based approach. For certain services, we are able to 
exactly identify the recipients. In most cases, however, sample survey data have been used as the basis 
for estimating probability of being a recipient conditional on specific geographic, demographic, and 
socioeconomic variables. When simulating recipients, we use the estimated probability equations to 
draw correct sector-specific numbers of recipients for each municipality. The simulated recipients may 
not necessarily be the same as the actual recipients, but as long as their relevant characteristics are 
taken into account a good approximation of the underlying distributional profiles of the value of public 
services should be obtained. When the recipients have been selected by simulation, the value of 
services is distributed equally among the selected recipients. 
 
For some services, such as health care, we use a risk related insurance benefit approach. Health care is 
viewed as an insurance benefit received by everyone covered by the insurance scheme regardless of 
actual use. However, the value of the services is allowed to vary with age, household type, and gender 
in line with the probability of being a recipient. Thus, differences in allocated in-kind benefits across 
persons may either arise from variation in the probability of being recipient, or from variation in the 
economic situation and service sector priorities across local governments.  
3. Geographical cost of living differences 
The official poverty measures in most developed countries make no adjustment for population 
heterogeneity beyond using equivalence scales to account for differences in household size and 
composition, implicitly assuming that the cost of living is constant within the country. Empirical 
evidence shows, however, that prices on basic goods, such as housing, differ significantly between 
urban and rural areas within a country. This motivated the National Academy of Sciences Panel on 
Poverty and Family Assistance in the United States to release a report recommending that the official 
poverty measure should be revised (Citro and Michael, 1995). One of the main recommendations was 
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that one had to account for geographical differences in the cost of living when measuring poverty. In 
particular, it was emphasized that there were significant variations in housing costs across regions of 
the country and that housing expenditure is one of the main expenditures of most households. 
Following up on this recommendation, a set of housing price indices were estimated and used to adjust 
the poverty threshold. 
 
Over the last years, the U.S. panel's adjustment for geographical cost of living differences has been 
extensively discussed and criticized. The U.S. panel’s view was that, although these indices contained 
inaccuracies, they were a marked improvement over the current measure, which makes no adjustment 
at all for geographical differences in the costs of living. Critics have argued, however, that even if 
incorporating geographical adjustments to poverty thresholds is appropriate in principle, the methods 
used to make these adjustments are too crude, primarily owing to a lack of credible data at a 
sufficiently disaggregated geographical level on housing unit characteristics and local amenities as 
well as on the prices of non-housing goods.9  
 
Acknowledging the controversy surrounding the use of local housing price indices in the measurement 
of poverty, this paper does not only account for geographical differences in the cost of living by 
estimating municipal price indices but also specifies municipal-specific poverty lines. Before 
discussing these approaches, a look at why it is necessary to adjust for geographical differences in the 
cost of living when measuring poverty is called for.  
 
Price-income relationship. Since the capacity of individuals to purchase goods that are not perfectly 
tradable depends on the level of resources of the other people around them due to the geographical 
pattern of competition, we would expect prices on certain goods, such as housing, to increase with the 
general income level in a municipality. In fact, Figure 3.1 shows a very strong correlation between 
average housing prices and the average (equivalent) income across the 435 municipalities in Norway, 
independent of the choice of equivalence scale. This indicates that the consumption potential of a 
given amount of income differs systematically between municipalities, which in turn suggests that 
studies disregarding regional price variation risk to produce a misleading picture of poverty.  
 
                                                     
9 See e.g. Short (2001), Iceland (2005), and Curran et al. (2006) for a discussion on the issue of adjusting for geographical 
cost of living differences in the measurement of poverty in the United States.  
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Figure 3.1:  Average housing prices and average income level by municipality in Norway, 1993-
2001 (Euro, Fixed 2001-prices) 
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The positive correlation between income levels and housing prices across the municipalities fits well 
with the prediction of the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson proposition that price levels on nontradable 
goods tend to rise with country per capita income.10 The basic argument underlying this proposition is 
that rich areas appear to be relatively more productive in tradables than nontradables. If the law of one 
price holds in the tradable sector, then inter-area relative wages are determined by productivity 
differences in tradables. In rich areas, the producers of nontradeable goods must set their prices 
relatively high to match the high wages in the tradeable sector. This implies that both nontradables, as 
well as a representative basket of nontradable and tradable goods, will be more expensive in high-
income areas compared to low-income areas. 
Municipal price indices. To achieve full comparability of incomes within the country, a transformation 
of the observed incomes into real incomes is required. The data we have available for making this 
transformation is (a) individual observations of income and location for the entire population, (b) 
summary statistics for housing prices across municipalities, and (c) average expenditure shares for the 
country as a whole used in the national consumer price index. In principle, the level of geographical 
aggregation for determining the price indices should be the local labor markets, which are 
approximated well by the more than four hundred municipalities of Norway. 
 
Given the information available, the Symmetric Star method for multilateral comparison appears 
favourable.11  A reason is that it compares municipalities indirectly via the average municipality, or 
                                                     
10 See e.g. Rogoff (1996) for an introduction to the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson theory and a survey of cross-country studies 
providing substantial support for the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson proposition. 
11 See Hill (1997) for a survey of multilateral methods for making comparisons of prices and quantities. 
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equivalently the country as a whole, and thereby ensures transitivity. Moreover, if we apply the 
Average Basket version of the Symmetric Star method we only need information about the price ratios 
between the municipalities and the expenditure shares of the average municipality, which corresponds 
to the expenditure shares used in the national consumer price index. This is attractive since we usually 
do not have credible data on municipality-specific expenditure shares, due to small sample sizes in 
household budget surveys. Applying the Average Basket version of the Symmetric Star method, the 
price index between municipality j and k can be defined as 
(3.1) ( )1
1
1
M
mk ma M
m
jk mk mj maM
m
mj ma
m
p q
A p p s
p q
=
=
=
= =
∑ ∑∑
, 
where the price of commodity m = 1, 2,…, M supplied in municipality j is denoted pmj, qma is the 
quantity of commodity m consumed in the average municipality a and sma the corresponding 
expenditure share. From (3.1) it is clear that the price index between municipality j and k is defined as 
the ratio of the Laspeyres index for the average municipality a and municipality k and j, respectively. 
The real income of an individual living in municipality j is given as the product of his observed 
income and the price index defined by (3.1).  
 
Price index issues. As long as the municipalities differ exclusively in commodity prices and the 
chosen price index is a reasonable approximation of the true cost of living index, the distribution of 
real income will correspond to the underlying distribution of welfare. For several reasons, caution 
might be called for.  
The price index defined by (3.1) accounts for geographical differences in housing costs, but not 
differences in other costs. For all other goods, we are forced to assume no geographic variation in 
prices due to lack of credible data. The same assumption is made by Short et al. (1998) and other 
studies of poverty in the United States that seek to adjust for geographical differences in the cost of 
living. This assumption is supported by Moulton (1995; p. 181) who notes that "the cost of shelter is 
the single most important component of inter-area differences in the cost of living". In fact, based on 
detailed price information for certain large metropolitan areas in the United States, Short (2001) 
reports that housing is the expenditure component with the largest geographic price variation, and 
adjusting for housing costs alone would represent a significant improvement in the measurement of 
poverty. As housing costs appear to be positively correlated with prices on other goods, the 
assumption of no geographic variation in non-housing goods can be argued to give downward biased 
estimates of the actual differences in the cost of living across areas (Jolliffe, 2006).  
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Even for housing costs, the price index defined by (3.1) assigns index values that may be in error. 
Substitution bias in the price index is one reason.12 Another reason is differences across areas in 
housing quality; owing to data availability, this paper disregards the issue of housing quality beyond 
limiting the comparison to prices per square meter on detached houses sold in the same year. Malpezzi 
et al. (1998) examine the housing quality issue by applying hedonic methods to a number of 
metropolitan areas in the United States based on the 1990 census data with information about rents, 
neighborhood characteristics, and contract conditions. When disregarding the quality issue (beyond 
limiting the comparison to two-bedroom apartments in which the occupant had moved into within the 
last 5 years) Short (2001) shows that housing price indices are very similar to the quality adjusted 
indices of Malpezzi et al. (1998). In terms of poverty rates, the comparison by Short (2001) indicate 
that adjusting for geographical variation in the cost of living improves the results, regardless of 
whether or not hedonic methods are used to deal with the issue of housing quality. 
 
A final reason for calling for caution when it comes to using the local housing price indices is the 
question of whether the needs of individuals apply broadly to the entire country or differ according to 
region of residence. Arguably, an individual’s commodity requirements depend on the circumstances 
of his or her reference group, which are, in turn, presumably influenced by the community to which he 
or she belongs. If one agrees with Sen (1984) that there is significant variability in the commodity 
requirements within a given country, then the levels of welfare individuals can achieve for a given 
amount of income may depend on their region of residence even when price patterns and qualities of 
goods are uniform within the country.  
 
Municipal-specific poverty lines. Unfortunately, Norway as most other countries lack credible data at a 
sufficiently disaggregated geographical level on housing unit characteristics and local amenities as 
well as on the prices of non-housing goods. The binding constraint for dealing with the above price 
index issues may therefore very well be the data. A possible response to these problems is to specify 
municipality-specific poverty lines according to the median income within each municipality.13 The 
purpose of applying such disaggregated poverty lines is to provide a meaningful measure of poverty in 
a country with geographical cost of living differences, when local price indices are too crude to 
produce sufficient comparability of income across areas. This is done by restricting the comparison of 
                                                     
12 Although the Average Basket method of the Symmetric Star Method satisfies important index number tests, including the 
Weak Factor Reversal Test and the Average Test for price indices, there are problematic aspects related to the welfare basis 
of the constructed real income measures (Hill, 1997). First of all, the price index is subject to the Gerschenkron effect. This 
adverse effect arises because expenditure patterns are likely to change in response to changes in relative prices, since 
individuals presumably substitute consumption towards relatively cheaper goods. Furthermore, if preferences are non-
homothetic no unique, true measure of real income exists, since the cost-of-living index depends on the utility level of the 
individuals from the reference municipality (Neary, 2004). See also Koo et al. (2000) for evidence from the United States on 
substitution bias in regional cost of living indices.  
13 Mogstad et al. (2007) used a similar approach based on regional-specific poverty lines. 
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income to individuals who live in the same municipality and are thus likely to face similar price 
pattern and quality of goods as well as share consumption habits. The poor are then defined as those 
whose income fall considerably short of the income commanded by the “representative” individual in 
their municipality.14  
 
When employing municipal-specific poverty lines, one runs the risk of disregarding genuine income 
differences across areas. Indeed, the choice of whether and how to account for geographical 
differences in the cost of living involves trading off potential bias in the poverty estimates from 
relying on a country-specific poverty threshold assuming uniform cost of living within the country, 
employing imperfect local housing price indices to derive real income estimates, or specifying 
disaggregated poverty thresholds limiting the comparison of incomes to individuals who are residing 
in the same area. 
4. Data, definitional issues, and the income measures 
Below, we provide an overview of the data as well as of the definitions and assumptions made in the 
empirical analysis. Furthermore, this section contrasts the conventional cash income measure with the 
extended income measure and the real income measure. 
4.1. Population of study 
The main data source is a panel data set based on administrative registers with household, geographic, 
and demographic information for the entire resident population of Norway for the period 1993-2001.15 
Table 4.1 shows the population composition by demographic and geographic characteristics, and 
demonstrates that the population composition has stayed relatively stable throughout the considered 
period and that roughly two out of three live in urban municipalities, excluding the capital Oslo. 
Furthermore, it is clear that nearly three quarters of the population live in couple households. In 
addition, an increasing trend in the share of immigrants is evident.  
 
                                                     
14 The justification of using municipality-specific poverty lines can be traced back to Sen (1979, p. 291) who argued "First, if 
the pattern of consumption behaviour has no uniformity there will be no specific level of income at which the ‘typical’ 
consumer meets his or her minimum needs. Second, if prices facing different groups of people differ, e.g. between social 
classes or income groups or localities, then poverty thresholds will be group-specific, even when uniform norms and uniform 
consumption habits are considered. These are real difficulties and cannot be wished away". 
15 People who die or emigrate over the year are excluded from the population of study. Students and wealthy individuals are 
not counted as poor. Because we lack credible data on wealth, an individual is classified as wealthy if he is registered with 
equivalent gross financial capital greater than or equal to a threshold of three times the median (equivalent) cash income. 
Similar sample selection criteria are regularly employed in official poverty statistics in Norway. 
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Table 4.1. Composition of population of study by centrality, household type, and ethnic origin 
Characteristic 1993 1996 1999 
Rural 23 % 23 % 22 % 
Urban 66 % 66 % 67 % Centrality  
Oslo 11 % 11 % 11 % 
Single parents 10 % 10 % 10 % 
Couples with children 56 % 56 % 55 % 
Couples without children 17 % 17 % 18 % 
Singles, 67 years and above 6 % 6 % 6 % 
Singles, 45-66 years 4 % 4 % 4 % 
Household type   
Singles, 44 years and below 7 % 7 % 7 % 
Immigrant 4 % 5 % 6 % 
Ethnic origin 
Norwegian 96 % 95 % 94 % 
Population size (Million) 4.2 4.3 4.3 
 
4.2. Methodological assumptions 
Equivalence scales. The economic unit in this paper is the household. When analysing poverty among 
households of varying size and composition, it is necessary to adjust the measure of cash income to 
enable comparison across individuals. In most poverty studies, interpersonal comparison of cash 
income is achieved by using equivalence scales. This study employs the widely used EU equivalence 
scale to normalise the cash income measure, which gives the first adult the weight 1, each additional 
adult is given the weight 0.5, and each child the weight 0.3. The robustness of the poverty estimates to 
the choice of equivalence scale is examined by the use of the OECD scale, where the weight of the 
first adult in the household is set to 1, each additional adult is given a weight of 0.7, and each child 
gets a weight equal to 0.5.  
 
The nature of some public services implies that neither of the above equivalence scales is suitable for 
application to the municipal in-kind benefits. The benefits derived from social care, administration and 
infrastructure are considered to be collective goods. This means that the consumption of the good is 
independent of household size; household members consume collectively the benefits from these 
services. In comparison, culture is considered to be a private good. For instance, subsidies given to 
sports activities and youth centers in the community are not collectively enjoyed by members of the 
household beside the recipient; consequently there are no economies of scale. The same argument can 
be argued to apply for child care, education, and health care. 
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Most of the services can be classified as either collective or private goods. An exception is care for the 
elderly and disabled. The recipient of care consumes nursing. In addition, he or she receives assistance 
in housework, which also yields benefits for the other household members. Thus this service is 
considered to be in part a private but also a collective good, and so an equivalence scale is relevant. In 
this case, we employ the OECD equivalence scale when allocating the value of care for the elderly and 
disabled on household members.  
 
Accounting period of income. It is well known that data on annual income may provide a misleading 
picture of the consumption possibilities of individuals and, consequently, also the extent of poverty in 
a society; the reasons range from transitory income shocks and life-cycle factors to institutional issues 
such as the accounting and tax rules for income from self-employment and financial assets.16 As a way 
of reducing the measurement problem of fluctuating annual income and obtain a reliable estimate of 
the economic resources available for consumption and saving (i.e. future consumption), the accounting 
period of income is extended from one to three years. On this basis, poverty lines are drawn.17 An 
accounting period of three years corresponds to what is done in the 2002 Poverty White Paper in 
Norway (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002).  
 
Poverty thresholds. We follow common practice in most developed countries and specify a set of 
poverty thresholds as a certain fraction of the median equivalent income. Specifically, we will focus 
on a set of poverty thresholds defined as 60 % of the median equivalent disposable income, with 
equivalent income calculated in accordance with the EU scale. However, recognising the inherent 
arbitrariness in specifying the exact poverty threshold, it can be instructive to apply other thresholds to 
evaluate the robustness of the results. Moreover, by applying multiple thresholds one can obtain a 
fuller picture of the problem of poverty in a society. Thus, we will supplement the analysis with 
poverty thresholds defined as 50 percent of the median equivalent disposable income, employing the 
OECD scale to calculate the equivalence income. For brevity, let the first type of poverty thresholds be 
called EU poverty lines and the second type of poverty thresholds be called OECD poverty lines.  
 
Below, we will focus attention on the results based on the EU poverty lines. The results based on the 
OECD poverty lines are displayed in Appendix C. In general, the choice between using EU and OECD 
poverty lines has a significant impact on the level of poverty, but does not influence the time pattern or 
                                                     
16 See Fjærli and Aaberge (2000) and Saez and Chetty (2003) who provide empirical evidence of tax-dependent income 
reporting behaviour that have strong impact of assessments of annual income.  
17 When decomposing poverty with respect to demographic characteristics such as age and household types of income, we 
use the state in the first year of the three year period. 
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the poverty profile. More importantly, the impact of local public services and geographical cost of 
living differences is robust to whether we let EU or OECD poverty lines form the basis of the analysis.  
4.3. Income measures 
Traditionally, income is defined in the economic literature as the maximum expenditure possible 
without depleting net wealth. Because of poor data on net wealth there is usually no room for 
performing empirical analyses based directly on this definition.  
 
Cash income. In most developed countries, poverty studies are typically based on a cash income 
measure. As illustrated in Table 4.2, the cash income measure used in this paper incorporates earnings, 
self-employment income, capital income, public cash transfers, and taxes. We derive the cash income 
measure based on income data from the Tax Assessment Files, which are collected from tax records 
and other administrative registers rather then interviews and self-reporting methods. The coverage and 
reliability of Norwegian income data are considered to be very high, as is documented by the fact that 
the quality of such national datasets of income received the highest rating in a data quality survey in 
the Luxembourg Income Study database (Atkinson et al., 1995).  
 
Table 4.2. Definition of cash income 
Market income  =  Employment income (earnings, self-employment income)  
                          +  Capital income (interest, stock dividends, sale of stocks) 
Total income     =  Market income 
+  Public cash transfers (e.g. old-age pension, unemployment and disability benefits, 
    child benefits and single parents benefits, social assistance) 
Cash income     =   Total income - taxes  
 
Extended income. Although cash income is acknowledged to be a suitable indicator of individuals’ 
economic resources and to be in close agreement with international recommendations (see e.g. Expert 
Group on Household Income Statistics, 2001), it fails to take into account all relevant income 
components, most notably perhaps the value of public services. To incorporate the value of local 
public services in the definition of income, we employ the model for valuing local public services 
discussed in Section 2.1. The empirical specification of the model relies on a sector classification of 
the local government accounts in Norway. This classification is defined by the following eight service 
sectors:  
(1) Administration 
(2) Education: Municipalities are responsible for 10 years of primary education 
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(3) Child care: Municipalities subsidize private and provide municipal kindergartens 
(4) Health care: Municipalities subsidize health services provided by general practitioners  
(5) Social services: Municipalities provide social assistance (cash transfers), child protection, 
and alcohol abuse protection 
(6) Care for the elderly and disabled: Municipalities provide nursing homes and home care 
(assistance to housework and nursing) for elderly and disabled 
(7) Culture: Municipalities subsidize sports, arts, museums, libraries, cinemas, and churches 
(8) Infrastructure: Municipalities are responsible for sewage and refuse collection, water 
supply, and maintenance of public roads 
 
The linear expenditure system defined by equations (2.1) – (2.4) provides a simultaneous treatment of 
the eight service sectors, which in some cases are shown to be affected by the same exogenous 
variables. The estimation of the model is based on detailed local government accounts and community 
characteristics for Norwegian municipalities in 1998.18 Definitions of the variables that affect unit 
costs, subsistence outputs and marginal budget shares as well as estimates of the associated parameters 
are displayed in Appendix A.  
 
An attractive aspect of our model for valuing public services is that we allow for differences between 
municipalities in the costs to produce the same standard of services. Dividing observed expenditure by 
the price index (2.3), the value of sector-specific services is given by (2.5). The price index reflects the 
relative differences in unit costs for providing services across municipalities, and is normalized such 
that the average for the whole country is equal to 1. Table 4.4 shows summary statistics for the 
distribution of sector-specific price indices. 
 
Table 4.4. Summary statistics of the sector-specific price indices, 1998 
Service sector Minimum Maximum Median Standard deviation 
Administration 0.93 2.48 1.09 0.42 
Education 0.92 2.00 1.10 0.16 
Child care 0.88 2.38 1.15 0.25 
Health care 0.81 3.42 1.26 0.45 
Social services 1 1 1 0 
Care for the elderly and disabled 0.81 3.82 1.09 0.26 
Culture 1 1 1 0 
Infrastructure 0.72 1.79 1.10 0.26 
                                                     
18 The model is estimated on a per capita basis by the maximum likelihood method where the error terms were assumed to 
have a multivariate normal distribution with mean vector 0 and unrestricted covariance matrix. See Aaberge and Langørgen 
(2003) for an extensive assessment of model specification. Note that the majority of the variables included in the model are 
also used as compensation criteria in the Norwegian cost-equalising formula for intergovernmental grants. 
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Summary information on the proportion of valued service production to total expenditures by 
municipality size is displayed in Table 4.5. It is clear that the value of services in small and sparsely 
populated municipalities tends to be lower than the actual expenditures. The results are interpreted as 
economies of scale, owing largely to the fact that smaller municipalities use a larger share of their 
economic resources on administration in most of the service sectors. Valued services vary between 
approximately 50 and 110 percent. Note that the national average falls below 100 percent simply 
because municipalities with different population sizes are given equal weights, which means that 
weights per capita are higher in smaller municipalities.  
 
Table 4.5.  Summary statistics for the ratio of the estimated value of municipal services to the 
observed expenditures by municipality size in 1998. Percent  
Municipality size Number of municipalities Mean Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
Small:  
Less than 5000 residents 245 79.9 50.4 108.4 9.5 
Medium:  
5,000 – 20,000 residents 150 99.7 71.9 109.3 6.0 
Large:  
At least 20,000 residents 40 105.4 96.6 110.1 2.9 
All municipalities 435 89.1 50.4 110.1 13.2 
 
Table 4.6. Expenditure and valued services by sector.* (Euro, Fixed 2001-prices) 
1993-1995 1996-1998 1999-2001 
Expenditure Valued services Expenditure 
Valued 
services Expenditure 
Valued 
services 
Sector 
Mean 
per 
capita 
Perc. 
share 
Mean 
per 
capita 
Perc. 
share 
Mean 
per 
capita 
Perc. 
share 
Mean 
per 
capita 
Perc. 
share 
Mean 
per 
capita 
Perc. 
share 
Mean 
per 
capita 
Perc. 
share 
Administration 339 10 243 9 361 9 259 8 434 10 308 9 
Education 893 25 724 26 985 25 801 26 1157 26 943 26 
Child care 271 8 209 7 311 8 240 8 328 7 255 7 
Health care 175 5 121 4 196 5 136 4 226 5 157 4 
Care for the 
elderly and 
disabled 
1035 29 833 30 1194 30 964 31 1378 31 1116 31 
Social services 178 5 92 3 177 4 93 3 199 4 116 3 
Culture 192 5 185 7 200 5 193 6 208 5 202 6 
Infrastructure 468 13 388 14 538 14 443 14 570 13 470 13 
All sectors 3552 100 2796 100 3962 100 3129 100 4499 100 3567 100 
* The means are computed on the basis of observations of the municipalities. Consequently, variation in population size 
across the municipalities is not accounted for, which explains why the overall mean of valued services differs from the 
overall expenditure mean. 
 
 21
Table 4.6 shows expenditures and valued services by sector. We see that the largest expenditure 
component is care for the elderly and disabled, closely followed by education. These two sectors 
account on average for more than a half of the total expenditures of municipalities. Furthermore, note 
that the shares of expenditures are relatively stable with only small variations throughout the period. 
 
In order to construct a measure of extended income that incorporates the value of municipal in-kind 
benefits for all individuals in each year of the period 1993-2001, we allocate the assessed values of 
sector-specific public services in each municipality on its inhabitants according to the method outlined 
in Section 2.2 and described in more detail in Appendix B. The allocation of municipal in-kind 
benefits on households and individuals is based on six different data sources: 
 
- Local government accounts that provide sector specific expenditures and fees on the 
municipal level  
- Demographic, social and geographic characteristics, which affect the subsistence 
expenditures of the municipalities and thus also the value of services 
- Number of recipients of different services by age and gender on the municipal level 
- Prices for child care and care for the elderly and disabled reported by municipalities  
- Individually based register information on cash income, age, gender, household type, and 
location 
- Data from sample surveys providing information on the use of public services on 
individual and household basis  
 
Extended income is defined as the sum of cash income and the value of in-kind benefits.  
 
Table 4.7 provide a decomposition of the mean extended income with respect to cash income and 
municipal in-kind benefits, where municipal in-kind benefits are defined as the (equivalent) value of 
municipal services subtracted user fees. The table shows that elderly singles on average earn relatively 
low cash income, whilst couples and singles under the age of 67 earn relatively high cash income. On 
the other hand, elderly singles receive the highest level of municipal benefits, whereas young singles 
receive the lowest level of benefits. Furthermore, single parents receive a higher level of in-kind 
benefits than couples with children. If we take a look at centrality we see that Oslo has the highest 
average level of extended income. We see that rural municipalities have the lowest level of average 
cash income, while urban municipalities have the lowest level of in-kind benefits. Moving on to ethnic 
origin, it is clear that the non-western immigrant groups have an average cash income significantly 
lower than the average cash income of the general population. 
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Table 4.7. Mean cash income, municipal in-kind benefits, and extended income by centrality, household 
type, and ethnic origin. EU scale. (Euro, Fixed 2001-prices) 
1993-1995 1996-1998 1999-2001 
Characteristic Cash 
income 
Municipal 
in-kind 
benefits 
Extended 
income 
Cash 
income 
Municipal 
in-kind 
benefits 
Extended 
income 
Cash 
income 
Municipal 
in-kind 
benefits 
Extended 
income 
Rural 20537 3732 24269 22190 4095 26285 24583 4598 29180 
Urban 22305 3326 25631 24321 3712 28033 27071 4206 31277 Centrality  
Oslo 24535 4069 28604 27012 4376 31388 30363 4785 35148 
Single 
parents 19827 3681 23508 21238 4085 25323 23394 4647 28040 
Couples 
with 
children 
23646 3258 26904 25842 3613 29455 28662 4118 32780 
Couples 
without 
children 
22568 2638 25206 24731 2926 27657 28095 3203 31297 
Singles,  
67 years 
and above 
13446 10390 23835 14487 11646 26133 16578 13252 29830 
Singles,  
45-66  
years 
19469 2111 21580 21055 2402 23457 23384 2760 26144 
Household 
type  
Singles,  
44 years 
and less 
20490 2454 22945 22436 2607 25042 24948 2859 27807 
Ethnic 
Norwegians 
and 
immigrants 
from 
western 
countries 
22295 3491 25786 24328 3865 28193 27117 4353 31470 
Ethnic 
origin 
Non-
western 
immigrants 
15490 3830 19320 17593 4082 21675 20423 4411 24834 
General population 22137 3499 25636 24134 3868 28002 26889 4355 31244 
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Real income. Because the essential purpose of the real income transformation carried out in this paper 
is to permit comparison of incomes between individuals living in different municipalities, we are 
particularly concerned about population heterogeneity that might be systematically correlated with the 
general income levels across the municipalities. Thus, accounting for variation in housing prices 
across the municipalities is critical for obtaining reliable estimates of real incomes. To this end, we use 
annual data on prices per square meter of detached houses sold in the various municipalities as a proxy 
for the price ratios for housing in the price index defined by (3.1). 19 For all other goods we assume no 
variation in prices across the municipalities, since we lack credible data sources. 
 
What remains in order to use (3.1) to achieve estimates of real incomes is to determine the weights for 
housing versus non-housing goods for the average municipality or equivalently for the country as a 
whole. To this end, we use data on expenditure shares obtained from the Norwegian household budget 
survey; these data also form the basis for determining the weights in the national consumer price 
index.20 In the period 1993-2001, the shares of housing related expenditures in aggregate household 
consumption expenditure range from about 22 to 26 per cent (excluding mortgage payments). Since 
there are 435 municipalities and we have access to annual information about prices and expenditure 
shares on housing for 9 years, altogether 3915 municipal-specific price indices are estimated on the 
basis of (3.1). Summary statistics for the municipal-specific private consumption price indices are 
shown in Table 4.8. The results confirm that there is substantial variation in housing prices across 
areas. 
 
Table 4.8.  Summary statistics for the municipal-specific private consumption price indices 
1993, 1997 and 2001* 
Year Minimum Maximum Median Standard deviation 
1993 0.82 1.01 0.88 0.02 
1997 0.82 1.00 0.87 0.02 
2001 0.78 1.00 0.84 0.03 
* Price indices are constructed with Oslo as the base municipality. Results for other years in the period 1993-
2001 are similar. 
 
                                                     
19 One could argue that it would be more appropriate to use rental prices rather than real estate prices. However, detailed data 
on local level for rental prices are not available in Norway. Moreover, most people in Norway are, by large, owners rather 
than renters. In any case, Norwegian survey data indicate that the geographical pattern for real estate prices largely mirrors 
that of rental prices (see Belsby et al., 2005).  
20 The household budget survey is based on personal interviews and detailed accounting in a representative sample of private 
households across the country. See Statistics Norway (2002) for a detailed description of the household budget survey.  
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Note that this paper does not assume that housing prices are the same within each municipality. 
Indeed, there are considerable price differences on housing also within certain municipalities, in 
particular across the various neighbourhoods of Oslo. However, as long as individuals are not required 
to live in a certain neighbourhood to participate in the local labour market, individuals from the same 
municipality can be argued to face the same prices although the prices on the goods they actually 
consume may vary due to, say, differences in purchasing power.  
 
Table 4.9 provides a comparison of the mean cash and real income across the municipalities. As 
expected, accounting for geographical differences in the cost of living boosts the income of rural areas 
relative to Oslo. This turns out to be the case, on average, also for urban areas. When it comes to 
differences across demographic subgroups in mean cash and real income, no clear pattern can be 
found. 
 
Table 4.9. Mean cash income and real income by centrality. EU scale. (Euro, 2001-prices) 
1993-1995 1996-1998 1999-2001 
Characteristic 
Cash income Real income Cash income Real income Cash income Real income 
Rural 20537 23460 22190 25446 24583 29454 
Urban 22305 24730 24321 26962 27071 30767 Centrality  
Oslo 24535 24600 27012 27097 30363 30498 
 
5. Empirical results 
This section examines the impact of accounting for local public services and geographical differences 
in the cost of living on poverty estimates based on EU poverty lines. We refer to Appendix C for 
poverty profiles based on OECD poverty lines. 
 
The level and time trend of poverty. Table 5.1 shows poverty estimates for the years 1993-2001; a 
period that includes both a soaring boom and the start of a small recession. The economic fluctuations 
are mirrored in our results by a decreasing trend in poverty. Our results also show that accounting for 
geographical cost of living differences does not affect the overall poverty level much. In contrast, the 
effect of incorporating public in-kind benefits in the income measure is striking. In general, the 
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poverty rates are cut in half. In comparison, accounting for local public services has modest impact on 
income inequality estimates.21 
 
Table 5.1. Poverty rates, 1993-2001. EU poverty lines 
 Country-specific thresholds Real income thresholds Municipal-specific thresholds 
 Cash income Extended income Cash income 
Extended 
income Cash income 
Extended 
income 
1993-1995 9.1 4.4 9.2 4.5 8.9 4.2 
1996-1998 8.8 4.0 8.8 4.0 8.5 3.7 
1999-2001 7.9 3.5 8.0 3.7 7.7 3.4 
 
Geographic poverty profile. Table 5.2 summarizes poverty results for municipalities by centrality. For 
brevity and without loss of generality, we present poverty profiles only for the period 1999-2001. The 
results show that incorporating public services in the income measure decreases the poverty rates in 
rural relative to urban areas and, especially, compared to Oslo. Furthermore, it is clear that the 
common practice of using a country-specific poverty line based on a cash income measure leads to 
upward biased poverty rates in rural areas, as we underestimate the standard of living afforded by a 
given level of income for inhabitants of rural municipalities. Taking into consideration cost of living 
differences across areas highlights that poverty in Norway is mostly a problem of the capital Oslo, 
which is overrepresented by subgroups prone to poverty such as non-western immigrants. Note that 
the choice between using housing price indices and municipal-specific poverty lines does not matter in 
terms of the upward biased poverty rates in rural areas when cost of living differences are ignored; 
employing housing price indices gives, however, a higher prevalence of poverty in Oslo.  
 
The United States experience is remarkably similar. For instance, Short (2001) finds that adjusting for 
geographical differences in the cost of living by means of local housing price indices has little impact 
on the national poverty rates, but gives a complete reversal of the geographic poverty profile in the 
United States. With no adjustment for the cost of living differences, the prevalence of poverty is 
higher in rural than in urban areas. When indices are used to adjust for cost of living differences, 
poverty rates are lower in rural than in urban areas. 
 
                                                     
21 In 1998, for example, the Gini coefficent based on cash income is 0.23, whilst the Gini coefficient based on extended 
income is 0.20.  See also Aaberge and Langørgen (2006) for an analysis of inequality in the distribution of extended income 
in a single year.  
26 
Table 5.2. Poverty rates by centrality, 1999-2001. EU poverty lines 
Country-specific thresholds Real income thresholds Municipal-specific thresholds 
Centrality 
Cash income Extended income Cash income 
Extended 
income Cash income 
Extended 
income 
Rural 9.8 3.8 7.8 2.8 7.2 2.5 
Urban  7.1 3.2 7.0 3.2 7.3 3.3 
Oslo 9.1 4.7 14.5 8.1 11.3 6.3 
 
Demographic poverty profile. Figure 5.1 shows the effect of accounting for local public services and 
geographical cost of living differences on poverty rates by household type. When focusing on cash 
income, the poverty rates are rather high among elderly (mostly female) singles, due to the fact that 
the poverty thresholds exceed the guaranteed minimum pension. However, as elderly people receive a 
high level of publicly provided care and health services, their poverty rates drop radically when we 
focus on extended income. The same is true for households with children, since they are heavy 
recipients of services such as education and child care. Due to the age structure and the relatively high 
fertility rate of non-western immigrants, their poverty rates also decline considerably when accounting 
for in-kind benefits. The group that benefits the least from public services, in the sense of experiencing 
the smallest decrease in poverty when local public services are added to cash income, is singles in the 
pre-retirement phase. This finding comes as no surprise, as singles in this age group usually have 
completed their education, few if any children living at home, and a demand for municipal care for the 
elderly and disabled that is still not pressing. We also find that taking into consideration cost of living 
differences across areas increases the level of poverty among non-western immigrants. An important 
reason is that a majority of the non-western immigrants in Norway lives in cities, predominately Oslo, 
where housing prices are relatively high. 
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Figure 5.1. Poverty rates by household type, 1999-2001. EU poverty lines 
 
 
Sensitivity analysis. The standard practice for valuation of public services in analyses of the 
distribution of extended income is to assume that the value of public services equals the observed 
expenditures of public authorities. This practice ignores any variation in unit costs for producing 
public services. By contrast, the present paper utilizes estimated price indices to compute deflated 
expenditures in different local public service sectors. Thus it is of interest to employ the non-deflated 
cost approach to examine whether or not our results are sensitive to the choice of valuation method. 
Poverty rates based on the non-deflated cost approach are reported in Appendix D. By comparing 
Table D.1 with Tables 5.1 and C.3, it is evident that the national poverty rates based on extended 
income are almost unaffected by the choice of valuation method. However, by comparing Table D.2 
with Tables 5.2 and C.4, it is clear that poverty is downward biased in rural areas and upward biased in 
urban areas when the non-deflated cost approach is used, provided that poverty estimates are derived 
from country-specific thresholds or real income thresholds. This result is due to the fact that unit costs 
for local public services are generally higher in rural than in urban areas. When poverty estimates are 
derived from municipal specific thresholds, the choice of valuation method does not affect the 
geographical poverty profile.  
6. Conclusion 
The standard practice in most developed countries is to identify the poor on the basis of a poverty line 
defined as a specific fraction of the median cash income within a country. The underlying assumptions 
behind the application of a country-specific poverty line are that everybody faces the same cost of 
living and that the distribution of public services mirrors the distribution of cash income. However, as 
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demonstrated in this paper these assumptions are not valid, since housing prices and the supply of 
municipal services differ substantially between rural and urban areas.  Moreover, we show that 
disregarding the value of local public services and geographical cost of living differences within a 
country yields a misleading picture of poverty. One may suspect that this finding generalises to other 
countries where government expenditure on public services make up a substantial share of total 
government transfers and/or there are cost of living differences across regions.  
 
We find that extending the traditional cash income measure with in-kind benefits from local public 
services cuts poverty levels in half. Poverty is reduced among all household types and especially 
among households with children and elderly singles. Households with children are heavy recipients of 
services such as education and child care, while elderly people receive much care and health services. 
Altogether, the results suggest that local public services in Norway are effective in fighting poverty. In 
comparison, taking into consideration local public services has modest impact on income inequality 
estimates.   
 
Accounting for geographical cost of living differences does not affect the poverty levels much, but 
changes the picture of the poor population in Norway considerably. In particular, the common practice 
of disregarding variation in housing prices within a country is shown to overestimate the poverty rates 
in rural areas. The results also highlight that poverty in Norway is mostly a problem of the capital 
Oslo. Interestingly, the United States experience is remarkably similar (see e.g. Short, 2001).  This 
evidence from two of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) highly differentiated worlds of welfare capitalism 
raises the question as to what extent the pattern of transfers from the central government to rural 
municipalities – which is apparent in most OECD-countries – adequately reflects today’s challenges to 
combat poverty.  
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Appendix A 
Estimation results of the model of local government spending 
The linear expenditure system provides a simultaneous treatment of the eight service sectors, which in 
some cases are shown to be affected by the same exogenous variables. The estimation of the model 
defined by (2.1) – (2.4) is based on detailed local government accounts and community characteristics 
for 426 Norwegian municipalities in 1998. The model accounts for spending on eight service sectors, 
and in the estimation we also include the budget surplus (operating result) as a sector in the model. 
The budget surplus is treated as a residual sector, which means that the model is representing an 
extended linear expenditure system. The explanatory variables in the model have been selected based 
on theoretical considerations and extensive testing of hypotheses (see Aaberge and Langørgen, 2003). 
 
The service sectors in the model are as follows: 
 
1. Administration 
2. Education 
3. Child care 
4. Health care 
5. Social services 
6. Care for the elderly and disabled 
7. Culture 
8. Infrastructure 
 
Estimated coefficients for variables that affect unit costs are displayed in Table A.1. The estimated 
parameters in Table A.1 is the basis for the valuation of services, see equation (2.5) and the 
construction of price indices in equation (2.3) and Table 4.4. The estimated unit costs are in most 
service sectors a decreasing function of population size, which is captured by the two indicators for 
small municipalities. This is taken as proof of economies of scale. It is found that scale economies are 
exhausted at 5000 residents. An important reason for smaller municipalities to have higher unit costs is 
that they use a larger share of resources on administration in most of the service sectors, including 
central administration. 
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Table A.1. Estimates of unit cost parameters * 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Children 0-5 years with basic 
or supplementary benefits 
  49.36 
(1.95) 
     
Children 6-15 years with basic 
or supplementary benefits 
 12.46 
(2.88) 
      
Mentally disabled persons 16 
years and above 
     75.21 
(21.29) 
  
Distance to center of municipal 
sub-district 
 0.11 
(7.82) 
0.19 
(4.40) 
0.19 
(3.17) 
 0.07 
(3.26) 
  
Distance to neighboring basic 
unit 
 0.15 
(3.06) 
 0.65 
(3.01) 
    
Indicator for small 
municipalities 0-2000 residents 
4.77 
(5.42) 
  1.80 
(1.26) 
 0.41 
(0.89) 
  
Indicator for small 
municipalities 0-5000 residents 
2.32 
(5.48) 
0.60 
(5.30) 
1.23 
(3.78) 
1.50 
(3.44) 
 0.44 
(2.91) 
 1.83 
(3.77) 
Sewage purification degree        0.27 (3.13) 
Amount of snowfall        0.05 (1.90) 
R2 adjusted 0.84 0.80 0.65 0.63 0.47 0.86 0.64 0.73 
 * T-statistics are in parentheses. The column numbers refer to service sectors in the simultaneous model. 
 
We find that higher dispersion of the local settlement pattern increases subsistence expenditure in 
education, health care, child care, and care for the elderly and disabled. The estimated positive 
relationships are attributed to unit costs, interpreted as reflecting costs of providing services on a 
decentralized level. For instance, when it comes to care for the elderly and disabled, travel time of the 
staff between client homes is increasing with dispersion, and thus sparsely populated municipalities 
have higher unit costs. To capture dispersion of settlement in the municipality, we use explanatory 
variables defined as the distances to the center of the municipal sub-district and the neighboring basic 
unit. 
 
Local government infrastructure services include sewage disposal and snow removal. Local variation 
in the requirements for sewage purification comes from national environmental regulations, and is 
assumed to affect unit costs in sewage disposal. Moreover, the costs to keep roads open in each 
municipality depend on the amount of snowfall, and thus unit costs are assumed to increase with the 
amount of snowfall. 
 
Local government expenditures are shown to increase with the share of mentally disabled, as this 
group is entitled to municipal care. The distribution of the mentally disabled across municipalities is to 
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a large extent driven by the fact that some municipalities are appointed as host communities for 
mentally disabled. To avoid that being a host community of mentally disabled increase the total output 
and welfare of the municipality, we assume that the share of mentally disabled affects unit costs. The 
same type of assumption has been applied to children in pre-school and school age that receive basic 
or supplementary benefits due to disablement. These children are found to increase unit costs in child 
care and education services. 
 
Estimated coefficients for variables that affect subsistence outputs are displayed in Table A.2. The age 
structure is assumed to affect subsistence outputs in education, child care and care for the elderly. 
Primary schools are compulsory for children 6-15 years of age, which means that production is 
increasing as a function of the number of children in this age group. It is found that children aged 13-
15 years receive more extensive services than children aged 6-12 years. This difference is mainly 
explained by more lessons and teachers with higher qualifications in the youth classes.  
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Table A.2. Estimates of subsistence output parameters * 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Constant 1.29 (11.29) 
1.12 
(2.60) 
-0.22 
(0.82) 
0.74 
(10.19) 
-0.46 
(3.15) 
3.53 
(8.55) 
0.78 
(11.77) 
2.16 
(8.68) 
Population share 1-5 years of 
age 
  8.94 
(2.81) 
     
Population share 6-12 years of 
age 
 22.20 
(5.50) 
      
Population share 13-15 years of 
age 
 56.25 
(6.97) 
      
Population share 67-79 years of 
age  
     -3.34 
(0.81) 
  
Population share 80-89 years of 
age 
     41.59 
(4.59) 
  
Population share 90 years and 
above 
     163.04 
(5.61) 
  
Full-time employed women 20-
44 years of age per capita 
  11.74 
(4.64) 
     
Refugees domiciled less than 
five years ago per capita 
    32.76 
(5.50) 
   
Unemployed 16-59 years per 
capita 
    6.20 
(1.18) 
   
Divorced/separated 16-59 years 
per capita 
    8.45 
(4.65) 
   
Population share of the poor     3.88 (1.56) 
   
Urban municipality criterion     0.15 (5.47) 
   
R2 adjusted 0.84 0.80 0.65 0.63 0.47 0.86 0.64 0.73 
 *All pecuniary amounts are in thousands of Norwegian kroner. T-statistics are in parentheses. The column 
numbers refer to service sectors in the simultaneous model. 
 
Although kindergartens differ from primary education by not being compulsory, the demand for child 
care is found to increase with the population share in the age group 1-5 years and the share of 
employed women in the group 20-44 years of age. Higher demand for child care is assumed to 
increase the subsistence output of child care services. 
 
The output in care for the elderly and disabled is treated as an insurance benefit received regardless of 
the actual use of services. This is in accordance with Smeeding et al. (1993). Just as in the private 
insurance market, the public provision of insurance increases as a function of risk and coverage. Risk 
is defined as probabilities that citizens become recipients, and coverage is described as the service 
standards that different types of clients can expect to receive. Since elderly people have a higher 
probability of becoming recipients of health related services, output is higher for elderly than for 
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young people (given the level of coverage). Subsistence output in care for the elderly is highest for the 
elderly 90 years and above. 
 
The value of services in the social care sector, which consists mainly of cash transfers to 
disadvantaged groups, is defined by expenditure. Consequently, the explanatory variables of the social 
service sector, determined as the population shares of disadvantaged groups, are assumed to affect 
subsistence output but not unit costs. 
 
Table A.3. Estimates of marginal budget share parameters* 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Constant 0.18 (7.41) 
0.11 
(3.61) 
-0.01 
(0.54) 
0.06 
(3.28) 
0.02 
(1.01) 
0.27 
(5.51) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
0.19 
(5.13) 
Share of socialists in municipal 
council 
0.003 
(0.16) 
0.036 
(1.45) 
0.070 
(4.15) 
-0.020
(1.32) 
0.029 
(2.01) 
0.069 
(1.69) 
0.021 
(1.77) 
-0.008
(0.25) 
Average education level for 
persons 30-59 years 
-0.025 
(2.76) 
0.007 
(0.54) 
0.019 
(2.23) 
-0.005
(0.67) 
-0.007
(0.90) 
-0.054 
(2.93) 
0.029 
(5.34) 
0.008 
(0.51) 
Share of population in densely 
populated areas 
-0.047 
(4.17) 
-0.027
(1.82) 
0.040 
(3.50) 
0.010 
(1.29) 
0.004 
(0.41) 
0.035 
(1.45) 
-0.002 
(0.22) 
-0.011
(0.66) 
R2 adjusted 0.84 0.80 0.65 0.63 0.47 0.86 0.64 0.73 
* T-statistics are in parentheses. The column numbers refer to service sectors in the simultaneous model. 
 
Estimated coefficients for variables that affect marginal budget shares are displayed in Table A.3. 
Three variables are included in the analysis; socialist share in the municipal council, education level 
and population density. A high socialist share is found to increase the supply of child care and social 
care. Municipalities with a high education level are found to give a high priority to child care and 
culture, and a low priority to administration and care for the elderly and disabled. Densely populated 
municipalities give a high priority to child care and a low priority to administration. 
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Appendix B 
Sector-specific allocation of the value of public services on 
individual and household basis  
Below, we describe how recipients are selected and the value of services distributed on recipients in 
the various service sectors.  
 
The value of administration services and user fees is assumed to be distributed uniformly on all local 
residents within each municipality. This assumption is adopted since we have no data on the 
distribution of administration services. 
 
For most services, we lack data to exactly identify the recipients. An important exception is primary 
education since it is compulsory for children in the age of 6-15 years. The value of municipal 
education services and user fees is assumed to be distributed uniformly on all children in the age group 
6-15 years.  
 
The child care sector consists of both municipal and private kindergartens. Since local governments 
subsidize private kindergartens, they are included in the analysis of in-kind transfers. First, we use data 
on cash for care benefits – which is a cash transfer to parents with small children that are not using 
municipal (subsidized) kindergartens – to exclude a subgroup of households from the population of 
potential recipients.22 Next, the population of potential recipients is divided into subgroups according 
to four dimensions: age of the child, household type, education level of the parents, and municipality. 
From summary statistics we know the number of children in kindergartens by age and municipality. 
For information on household type and education level we utilize a national survey, which includes 
5,000 households, where the type of child care is reported for each child. This information is used to 
estimate the total number of children in kindergartens by household type and education level. Thus we 
have information on the marginal distribution of children in kindergartens by age and municipality, 
and also the marginal distribution by household type and education level. The estimation of the 
simultaneous distribution by age, household type, education level, and municipality is based on a log-
linear model where the second-order interaction-component is equal to zero. The model was 
introduced by Birch (1963), and the maximum likelihood estimation method is called “iterative 
proportional fitting” or “raking.” From each subgroup, the estimated number of children in 
                                                     
22 The cash for care benefits were introduced in August 1998. In the period 1999-2001, the children of households receiving 
more than half of maximum cash for care benefits are excluded from the population of potential recipients.  
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kindergartens is selected by random drawing. Thus the four dimensions above are taken into account 
in the selection of recipients. For each municipality, we assume that the assessed value of the child 
care services is distributed uniformly on the selected recipients. Conforming to standard practice in 
kindergartens, user fees are means tested against household gross income.23  
 
County governments or the central government run hospitals, but municipalities subsidize health 
services provided by general practitioners.24 This paper treats municipal health services as insurance 
benefits. For information on age and gender distribution of the patients we utilize a national survey 
that includes 5,000 households. Respondents are asked whether they have visited a general practitioner 
in the last 14 days before the interview. This information forms the basis for estimating an age and 
gender specific probability of visiting a physician. The value of health care and user fees in each 
municipality is distributed to individuals in proportion to their probability of being recipient. 
 
The social care sector consists of social assistance (which is a cash-transfer to disadvantaged 
households), child protection, and alcohol abuse protection. From administrative register data, we 
know the distribution of social assistance on individuals and households.25 However, the distribution 
of expenditures for child protection and alcohol abuse protection is unobserved. We assume that the 
distribution of these in-kind benefits mirror the distribution of social assistance. Based on the observed 
recipient frequencies of social assistance by age and income level, we compute the probability of 
receiving social assistance. These probabilities are utilized to derive a distribution for social care 
services in-kind. Each household receives a share of the value of social care services in-kind, which is 
proportional to the probability of receiving social assistance. Consequently child protection and 
alcohol abuse protection are treated as insurance benefits; everyone receive benefits, but poor 
households receive more than rich households, and elderly people receive less than young adults. 
Within each municipality, we assume that households belonging to the same income and age group 
receive equal in-kind benefits from social services. User fees are distributed according to the same 
weights as in-kind benefits. 
 
                                                     
23 The distribution of user fees is based on a sample of 105 municipalities, which have reported standardized user fees for 
three different levels of household gross income. The data are used in a regression of user fees on household income and 
local government income. The user fees are found to increase with household income and decrease with local government 
income. The model is used to predict user fees for all children that have been selected as recipients. The prediction for each 
child is adjusted for the average rate of price reduction for brothers and sisters, and the predictions are calibrated against the 
sum of user fees reported in the local government accounts. 
24 Health care provided by public hospitals is not included in the analysis of public in-kind benefits in the present paper. 
25 Thus, social assistance is treated as cash income instead of as an in-kind benefit in the analysis. 
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The care for elderly and disabled sector consists of nursing homes and home care (assistance to 
housework and nursing). This paper treats the municipal services for care for the elderly and disabled 
as insurance benefits. From summary statistics we know the number of recipients by age group, 
gender, and municipality. For information on household type we utilize a national survey, which 
includes 5,000 households. This information is used to estimate the total number of elderly and 
disabled recipients by household type. Thus the available data provide information on the marginal 
distribution of recipients by age, gender, and municipality, and also estimates of the marginal 
distribution by household type. The estimation of the simultaneous distribution by age, gender, 
household type and municipality is based on a log-linear model where the second-order interaction-
component is equal to zero. This is used to derive estimates of the probability of being a recipient by 
age, gender, household type, and municipality. The value of care for the elderly and disabled in each 
municipality is distributed to individuals in proportion to their probability of being recipients. This 
means that all individuals receive in-kind benefits, but the amounts depend on the likelihood of being 
a recipient and the economic situation and priorities of each local government. User fees are 
distributed according to similar weights as services.26  
 
Municipalities subsidize cultural activities like sports, arts, museums, libraries, cinemas and churches. 
The frequencies of participation in the different types of activities are reported in a national survey, 
which includes 5,000 households. To construct an index of demand for culture by different 
respondents, the rates of participation in different activities are weighted by total municipal 
expenditures for each activity. The respondents are divided in groups according to education and the 
average index of demand is computed for each education level. It is found that average demand is 
increasing with the education level. The value of cultural services in each municipality is distributed to 
individuals in proportion to the average demand by education level. For a given education level and a 
given municipality, individuals are assumed to receive the same amount of in-kind benefits. All 
members of a given household receive the same level of services, which are determined by the highest 
education level in the household. User fees are distributed to persons according to the same weights as 
services. 
 
                                                     
26 Unfortunately, we have no information about actual prices in nursing homes. Thus, we assume that user fees in nursing 
homes are proportional to user fees in home-care services. User fees in home-care for the elderly and disabled have been 
reported in a sample of 314 municipalities. To derive estimates for all municipalities in Norway, we compute the average 
user fee per month by household income. The average user fee is weighted by the probability of being a recipient. This 
weighted average user fee gives an estimate of the fee for each person, and after aggregation over persons within each 
municipality we derive the share of fees paid by each person. The estimates are calibrated against the sum of user fees 
reported in the local government accounts. 
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Municipalities are responsible for several infrastructure services including public roads, housing, 
water supply, and sewage and refuse collection. For these services we assume that in-kind transfers 
and user fees are distributed uniformly across households. Thus, for a given municipality, each 
household receives the same transfer.  
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Appendix C 
Empirical results based on the OECD equivalence scale and poverty lines 
 
Table C.1.  Mean cash income, municipal in-kind benefits, and extended income by centrality, household type,  
and ethnic origin. OECD scale. (Euro, Fixed 2001-prices) 
1993-1995 1996-1998 1999-2001 
Characteristic Cash 
income 
Municipal 
in-kind 
benefits 
Extended 
income 
Cash 
income 
Municipal 
in-kind 
benefits 
Extended 
income 
Cash 
income 
Municipal 
in-kind 
benefits 
Extended 
income 
Rural 17121 3673 20794 18550 4033 22582 20594 4519 25113 
Urban 18702 3279 21981 20415 3657 24072 22750 4138 26888 Centrality  
Oslo 21334 4024 25357 23412 4317 27728 26328 4732 31060 
Single  
parents 16807 3631 20438 18030 4029 22059 19823 4582 24405 
Couples  
with  
children 
18856 3211 22067 20603 3558 24161 22828 4050 26878 
Couples  
without  
children 
19936 2536 22472 21840 2806 24647 24803 3071 27873 
Singles,  
67 years  
and above 
13435 10388 23823 14479 11645 26123 16568 13251 29819 
Singles,  
45-66 years 
19323 2109 21432 20910 2400 23310 23215 2757 25972 
Household 
type  
Singles,  
44 years  
and less 
19862 2448 22310 21844 2601 24445 24306 2852 27158 
Ethnic 
Norwegians  
and western 
immigrants 
18756 3441 22197 20494 3807 24301 22877 4284 27161 
Ethnic 
origin 
Non-
western 
immigrants 
12858 3796 16654 14529 4044 18573 16844 4364 21207 
Total population 18620 3449 22069 20322 3814 24136 22672 4287 26958 
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Table C.2.  Mean cash income and real income by centrality. OECD scale (Euro, Fixed 2001-
prices) 
1993-1995 1996-1998 1999-2001 
Characteristic 
Cash income Real income Cash income Real income Cash income Real income 
Rural 17121 19557 18550 21271 20594 24674 
Urban 18702 20733 20415 22630 22750 25854 Centrality  
Oslo 21334 21389 23412 23485 26328 26443 
All 18620 20533 20322 22417 22672 25661 
 
Table C.3. Poverty rates, 1993-2001. OECD poverty lines 
Country-specific thresholds Real income thresholds Municipal-specific thresholds 
 Period 
Cash income Extended income Cash income 
Extended 
income Cash income 
Extended 
income 
1993-1995 1.9 1.0 2.1 1.1 2.2 1.1 
1996-1998 1.8 0.8 1.9 0.9 1.9 0.8 
1999-2001 1.7 0.7 1.9 0.8 1.8 0.8 
 
Table C.4. Poverty rates by centrality, 1999-2001. OECD poverty lines 
Country-specific thresholds Real income thresholds Municipal-specific thresholds 
Centrality 
Cash income Extended income Cash income 
Extended 
income Cash income 
Extended 
income 
Rural 1.5 0.5 1.2 0.5 1.0 0.4 
Urban  1.5 0.6 1.5 0.7 1.6 0.6 
Oslo 3.6 1.6 5.7 2.6 5.0 2.4 
 
Figure C.1. Poverty rates by household type, 1999-2001. OECD poverty lines 
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Appendix D 
Empirical poverty results when in-kind benefits are not adjusted 
for unit cost variation in municipal service production 
  
Table D.1. Poverty rates based on cash income plus municipal expenses, 1993-2001  
Country-specific 
thresholds Real income thresholds 
Municipal-specific 
thresholds Year 
EU OECD EU OECD EU OECD 
1993-1995 4.4 1.0 4.5 1.1 4.2 1.1 
1996-1998 3.9 0.8 4.0 0.9 3.8 0.8 
1999-2001 3.5 0.7 3.7 0.9 3.5 0.8 
 
 
Table D.2. Poverty rates based on cash income plus municipal expenses by centrality, 1999-2001 
Country-specific 
thresholds Real income thresholds 
Municipal-specific 
thresholds Centrality 
EU OECD EU OECD EU OECD 
Rural 3.1 0.5 2.3 0.4 2.5 0.4 
Urban 3.4 0.6 3.4 0.7 3.3 0.6 
Oslo 4.9 1.7 8.7 2.7 6.3 2.5 
 
 
